Abstract
The increasing interconnectivity with external networks and the higher reliance on digital systems make chemical and process industries, including waste and drinking water treatment plants, more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Historical evidence shows that these attacks have the potential to cause events with severe consequences on property, people, and the surrounding environment, posing a serious threat. While the risks deriving from the malicious manipulation of the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) and the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) in chemical and Oil&Gas facilities have been systematically analysed in the available literature, including previous works of the Authors, the analysis of the consequences of cyber-attacks to drinking water treatment plants has not been conducted to date. To fill this gap, in the present study the methodology POROS 2.0 (Process Operability Analysis of Remote manipulations through the cOntrol System) developed by the Authors was applied to a drinking water treatment plant, providing valuable insights on possible critical scenarios originated by cyber-attacks in these facilities.
